Why biological neuroscience cannot replace psychology by Chater, N
Why biological neuroscience 
cannot replace psychology
Nick Chater
Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL United
Kingdom. nick.chater@warwick.ac.uk
Abstract: Gold & Stoljar argue persuasively that there is presently not a
good case for the “radical neuron doctrine.” There are strong reasons to
believe that this doctrine is false. An analogy between psychology and eco-
nomics strongly throws the radical neuron doctrine into doubt.
Gold & Stoljar (G&S) have provided an excellent case for believ-
ing that current arguments for the “radical” version of the neuron
doctrine – that a successful theory of the mind will consist purely
of biological neuroscience – are not persuasive. In this commen-
tary, I take the next step and argue directly that the radical neu-
ron doctrine is false.
In cognitive science it is standard to view the mind as a com-
putational device. An analogy with conventional digital computers
then immediately suggests that an equivalent of the radical neu-
ron doctrine – what one might term the “radical transistor doc-
trine” – is patently absurd. The entire subject matter of computer
science testifies that a successful theory of digital computation is
not couched in terms of transistors or, indeed, in terms of electri-
cal engineering at all. Instead, there is discussion of programming
languages, computer programs, data structures, and so on, none
of which has any interpretation at the level of transistors. How-
ever, this argument is not likely to persuade advocates of versions
of the radical neuron doctrine, because they simply reject the
analogy between the brain and digital computation.
Let us therefore consider instead a different domain: econom-
ics. Economists talk about notions such as “money,” “price,” “in-
flation,” and so on. The laws of economics are defined over these
and similar notions. Let us call the “radical physics doctrine” the
view that economic phenomena should really be explained purely
in terms of physical properties of the world. The deep problem
with this doctrine is that economic notions do not have any phys-
icalistic specification. Crudely, there is nothing physical about the
note in my pocket that makes it worth five pounds sterling. After
all, an atom-by-atom replica of the note created by some devious
forger will be worth nothing, though it will pass successfully into
circulation unless its origins are revealed. Moreover, if the Bank
of England decides to mint a five pound coin, and remove the note
from circulation, my note becomes worthless, even though its
physical properties are unchanged. Similarly, and perhaps more
strikingly, consider that the only physical correlate of my bank bal-
ance may be a complex distributed physical pattern on the hard
disk of my bank’s computer. The economic properties of my bank
balance are (I hope) unchanged if my bank changes its computer
system, or switches to a different kind of storage medium, but the
physical correlate of my bank balance changes radically. Quite
generally, economic concepts and laws can simply not be ex-
pressed at all in the language of physics; it would therefore seem
to be a great mistake to attempt to explain economic phenomena
in purely physical terms. The radical physics doctrine would ap-
pear doomed.
What is the upshot of the analogy? It places advocates of the
radical neuron doctrine on the horns of the dilemma: They must
either accept the analogy between the two doctrines and some-
how find a way to accept the radical physics doctrine with respect
to economics or find a disanalogy between this doctrine and the
radical neuron doctrine, which shows the latter to be more ac-
ceptable.
The first option seems extremely unappealing. By staying with
physical descriptions we are simply unable to talk about “money,”
“price,” and so on, yet these notions appear to be central not just
to present theoretical accounts of economics but to the very sub-
ject matter of the discipline. To put the point simply, we have no
way of conceiving how we might predict and explain phenomena
in terms of, say, elementary particles that we currently predict and
explain in terms of supply and demand.
However, the second option is also difficult to defend. There
seems to be no more reason to suppose that psychological notions,
such as “memory,” “attention,” and so on will one day be replaced
by rigorous talk about neurons than there is to suppose that eco-
nomic notions, such as “money,” will be replaced by talk about
physics.
One attempt to make the overthrow of psychology by neuro-
science seem plausible points to the provisional, partial, and gen-
erally unsatisfactory state of psychological theory, but the very
same criticism can be levelled at economics. In both cases, what
seems to be required is more and better theory at the same level
of analysis; it seems patently self-defeating to attempt a radical
shift to a different and more basic level of analysis.
Another attempt to make the overthrow of psychology by neu-
roscience seem plausible points to the fact that neuroscientists are
gradually clarifying how psychological notions such as “memory”
have a neural basis (in terms, for example, of long-term potentia-
tion; Bliss & Lømo 1973). This is of no help, however, because this
kind of knowledge is already in place in the economic case – we
already know that the “physical basis” of my being able to buy a
newspaper consists of the possession of coins or notes with par-
ticular physical properties. The problem is that in neither the psy-
chological nor the economic context are the physical properties
appropriate for couching relevant generalizations: The physical
properties of a note do not make it worth five pounds, and the
physical properties of a memory do not make it a memory of vis-
iting London or buying a filing cabinet. In sum, the radical physics
and the radical neuron doctrine seem equally unattractive as guid-
ing principles for scientific research; in both cases, accepting the
doctrines immediately undercuts the theorist’s ability even to talk
about the phenomena of interest, let alone to explain them.
G&S end their target article with a plea for further work in what
they see as the underdeveloped field of the philosophy of neuro-
science, to be concerned with the “presuppositions and philo-
sophical problems of neuroscience itself” (sect. 6.2, para. 2). I sus-
pect that the philosophy of neuroscience appears underdeveloped
because there simply is nothing to develop. Once the confusions
and ambiguities concerning the relationship between neuro-
science and other perspectives on the mind are clarified and are
cleared away, as G&S have so ably done, the link between neuro-
science and philosophically interesting issues is broken. Perhaps a
putative philosophy of neuroscience would be no more substan-
tial than a putative philosophy of cellular processes in the lung or
the heart.
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